SOME CHARACTERISTICS OF GEN. U. S. GRANT.
BY MAJ. GEN. GREN\TL.IJE M. DODGE.
For twenty years following the death of General Grant, I was at the head of the Grant Birthday Association of New York City. At it'i meeting on each birthday gathered srutesmen, diplomats and distinguished citizens of our country to honor his niemorj'. Of all tbe great, eloquent and interesting tributes paid to him, it waa the opinion of the Association that two of the best and most eloquent were delivered by Iowa men, Robert G. Cousins and John S. Runnells.
It is a fact not generally known, that after every successful battle, after every campaign that General Grant was engaged in, almost before the dead upon the field were buried, he had made in his own mind a plan for the using of the army composed of veterans that had already fought and won the battle, to move immediately again upon the enemy. Ever;^ one of those plans, up to ßlarch, 1864, was disapproved. In some cases he was relieved of command, in others his armies were distriliuted over the country and did not accomplish much for a year.
General Grant started out as Colonel of the Twenty-first Illinois Infantry. His first movement upon the enemy was from Haünil>al, Jlissoni'i. He was ordered out to a plaee called Florida, Missouri, to attack Colonel Harris, who was in command of a Confederate force there. He used to tell us with what great trepidation and fear he went on that trip, and he described it a great deal better than I can. He said:
As we approached the brow of the hill from which it was expected we could see Harris' camp and possibly find bis men ready formed to meet ns, my heart kept getting higher and higher, nntil it felt to me as though it was in my throat. I would have given anything then to have heen back in Illinois, but I hadn't the moral courage to halt and consider what to do; I kept right on. [When it was found that Harris iiad left] it occurred to me at once that Harris had heen as much afraid of me aa I had been of him. This was a view of the question I had never taken before; hut it was one I never forgot afterwards. From that event to the close of the war, I never experienced trepidation upon confronting an enemy, though I always felt more or less anxiety. I never forgot that the enemy had as much reason to fear my forces as I had his. The lesson was valuable. ' General Sherman always said that the difference between himself and General Grant was that Grant never was afraid of anything he could not see, while he was afraid of what he could not see.
From this expedition. General Grant was sent to command the distriet of Cairo. He had not been there long before he was ordered to make a reconnoissance to the west side of the Mississippi river, opposite Columbus, Kentucky, witb a view to holding what force there was on that side of the river, keeping them from moving out to the aid of some Confederates stationed at St. Francis, on the St. Francis river, which another force of the Union army had gone to attiKîk.
General Grant said that when he started out be had no idea of fighting, but when he got aboard the boat, he found every man on board expected if they saw the enemy to attack him. He further said, "I saw that if I met tbe enemy and did not attack him, I would lose the confidence of those men, and I made up my mind no matter what force I met I would fight." Hence the result of Belmont. It was not a big battle, but was one of the first in the West, and firet drew the attention of the West to Grant.
When General Grant got hack to Cairo he found the enemy's line of defense stretched from Columbus, on the Mississippi river, due east to Fort Henry on the Tennessee, Fort Donelson on the Cumberland and due east to Bowling Green in Kentucky, and as a trained soldier he began to study the line and how to break it. He decided that the way to break it was to attack its center by way of either the 'Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant, v. 1, Tennessee or the Cumberland river and he immediately wrote to General Halleck his views. The letter received such a response ilmt Grant did jiot know whether he had made a practical su^jgestion or not. Ilowever, it was still in his mind and he obtained leave to go to St. Louis to consult General Iíalleck in relation to Ihe views with which he was so strongly imbued. lie said when he went into the office und SHW General Halleck. he was received with so little cordiality that he tliought he had stated the subject of his visit with less clearness tlian he might have done. He had not uttered many sentences before he was cut short as if his plan was proposiprnns. and he returned to Cairo very much crestfallen.
On his return to Cairo, General Grant did not give his plan np. Commodore Foote was then in command of what was known as the "Tin Clad Fleet" on tbe Mississippi river, and having his headquarters near, General.Grant consulted him. knowing that General Haileck had confidence in his judgment. The Commodore saw immediately the strength of the plan and wrote to General Halleek, who then wrote to General Grant aud authorized him to go as far up the Tennessee river with his force as tn capture Fort Henry. There he was to stop, but as soon as he took Fort Henry he immediately marched on Donelson. notifying Halleek of the move and that he should go and capture Donelson unless he was stopped. He captured Donelson and as soon as lie captured it witJi all the rebel forces thero. General Grant, in his own mind, knowing that BucU was marching from Bowling Green toward Nashville, said, *'If Buell and I can join our forces, the enemy are so demoralized and I have captured so Jiiany of them, there is nothing to prevent us from moving from here immediately to Vicksburg and opening the Mississippi river."
General Grant visited Nashville to consult Buell on his j)lan and he gives his reason as follows;
If one general who would have taken Üie responsibility had been in command of all of the troops west of the Alleghanies, he could have marched to Chattanooga, Corinth, Memphis and Yir-ksburg with the troops we then had, and as volunteering was going on rapidly over the North there would soon have been force enough at all these centers to operate offensively against any body of the enemy tbat might be found near them. Rapid movements and the acquisition of rel)ollious territory would have promoted volunteering, so that reinforcements could have been had as fast as transportation could have been obtained to can-y them to their destination. On the other hand, there were tens of thousands of strong a,ble-bodied young men still at their home.s in the southwestern States, who had not gone into the Confederate army in February, 1862, and who had no particular desire fo go. If our lines had been extended to protect their homes, many of them never would have gone. Providence ruled differently. Time was given the enemy to collect armies and fortify his new positions; and twice afterwards he came near forcing his northwestern front up to the Ohio river.* General Grant was relieved because, as Halleck stated to McClellan, they could get no reports or dispatches from him; they could not hear from him ; they didn 't know where he was ; he had gone outside of his command and was guilty of violation of the regulations and his orders. McClellan, after receiving several dispatches of this tenor, authorized Halleck to relieve nnd if necessary arrest Grant, but in a few days they discovered that all of Grant's dispatches went to a telegraph operator who was a rebel, who took the dispatches and instead of sending them tn Ilalleck sent them to the rebels. General Halleek in his dispatch declared General C. F. Smith had won the battle, and recommended his promotion to l\Tajor General.
Instead of following the plan of Grant, which was very feasible, Buell's and Grant's armies lay there nearly two months before they moved to Pittsburg Landing. In the meantime, as we read the Confederate records now, the enemy were completely demoralized. They had no army in our front. They thought that Buell and Grant would immediately move forward into tbeir own country, as Grant proposed, and were greatly astonished tbat they did not. They could not understand it. In the meantime they gathered courage and organized a force under General Alhert Sidney Johnston, concentrating it at Corinth. General Grant, in referring to his troubles with Halleck wrote a letter to his wife that states more clearly than I can the position he was in and the reasons for his being relieved of his command. He \Yi*ote as follows :
All the slander you have seen against me originated away from where I was. The only foundation was the fact that I was ordereä to remain at Port Henry and send the expedition up the Tennesset! river under command of Major Genera! C. F. Smith. This was ordered because of Fort Donelson. The same thing occurred with me. I was not receiving the orders, but knowing my duties, wa.s reporting daily, and when anything occurred to malte it necessary, two or three times a day. When I was ordered to remain behind, it was the cause of much disappointment among the troops of my command and aiso of astonishment. When I was again ordered to join them, they showed, I believe, heartfelt joy.
I never allowed a word of contradiction to go out from my headquarters, thinking this the best course. I know, though I do not like to speak of myself, that General Halieck would regard this army badly ofE if I were relieved. Not hut what there are generals with it abundantly ahle to command, but because it would leave Inexperienced officers senior in rank. You need not fear but what I will come out triumphantly; I am pulling no wires, as political generals do, to advance myself. I have no future ambitions. My object is to carry on my part of this war successfully, and I am perfectly willing that others may make all the glory they can out of it.* This letter is characteristic of General Grant. When General Grant was removed. General C. F. Smith was assigned to the commiand with instructions to move the army to Savannah and Pittsburg Landing. Soon after General Halleck received General Grant's reports of his campaign and ascertained the reason for the delay in receiving his dispatches, he reinstated him in command of the army and he proceeded to Savannah and relieved General C. F. Smith, who was sick at the time and soon after died.
Grant went to Savannah with no idea o£ holding his army there but of coneentrating lus forces on the west side of the *P. D. Grant.
Tennessee river and moving immediately upon Albert Sidney Johnston'.s force, no matter where it was. There has been a great deal of criticism of General Grant and General Sherman and all the generals at Shiloh, but there is only one thing that might be fairly criticised, and that was when General Smith landed the green troops on the west side of tihe river, he did not intrench them. We learned something from the failure to do that; it was a good lesson. From that time our army never stopped anywhere where there was an enemy •ear our front that we did not intrench ; in fact, every soldier buried himself before he went to sleep. But we did not know anything about throwing up intrenchments then.
General Grant in his conversation with us after Shiloli said tbat when lie knew the enemy had all their men in action during the day and yet he had been able to hold them, he had no doubt by midnisrht of the first day, that with Wallace's twelve tihoasand men who had not fired a gun, he would have been able to defeat Beauregard in the morning and march on Corinth. When Buell eame it was doubly sure. The two armies combined made a much, larger force than Beauregard's army.
Grant then said in a telegram that in two days he could take Corinth if he were allowed, but Halleek ordered tihem not to go beyond a certain point until he arrived. That order of General Halleek's was the reason why Grant is criticised for not going forward when he had Buell's army and his own. Grant was satisfied Corinth could have been captured in a two days' campaign made immediately after Shiloh, without any additional reinforcements. After Corinth they had a movable force of 81.000 men, besides sufficient force for holding all territory acquired in any campaign. New Orleans and Baton Rouge were ours, and the enemy had only a single line of railroad from Vicksburg to Richmond, and in one move we had the opportunity to occupy Vicksburg and Atlanta without much opposition, but we continued to pursue the policy of distributing this great army and for nearly a year accomplished no great results from it, giving up the territory back to Nashville, holding only the line from the Tennessee river to Memphis.
As soon as General Halleck took command, General Grant was virtually relieved. He was second in command. That means nothing. I have heard General Grant say that when they were approaching Corinth he proposed that he should take what was known as the Army of the Mississippi under General Pope and swing to the south of Corinth on the enemy's communication and fiank Beauregard out of Corinth or make him come o\it and fight. But he says in his statement in relation to it that it was turned down so promptly and abruptly that he thought possibly he had made an unitiilitary suggestion.
It was not long until Beauregard was driven out of Corinth, and General Halleck was called to Washington by President Lincoln to the conunand of the armies. General Grant, instead of being put back into the place ]ie was entitled to, the command of the army, was simply given the command of the district of west Tennesset!, the same district that I commanded afterwards, and it was quite a time before he was given the higher command of the Army of the Tennessee. Up to this time our Government and tlie officers in Washington had no confidence in Grant for some reason, and it is hard to tell why.
A criticism made by a staff oflScer to me of this action of General Halleck's in not giving Grant the command of the Army of tlie Tennessee, and of the fact of Halleck, who had never fought a battle, being selected to go to Washington and take command of all the armies, shows the views at that, time of men who were under General Grant and knew him:
As one reads the reports and makes comparisons, first Grant fighting at every opportunity, winning every battle, planning to move on the enemy after every battle, but stopped, humiliated after each campaign, and finally when given a command only allowed a district, while on the other hand Halleck, who had not fought a battle, who took fifty-five days or more with two men to the enemy's one to make twenty miles, which by a simple fiank movement coulû have heen accomplished in two days, with one of the best opportunities of the war to capture or destroy an army of 50,000 men, Halleck who prevented Grant from reaping the full benefit of every hattle he fought, is brought to Washington and given full command of all the armies, while Grant was not even allowed to resume command of the department he vacated, the record Is most astonishing.
Halleck had no confidence in Grant, The officers in the field looked on in amazement, and wondered what the powers in Washington could be thinking about. Grant accepted whatever was given him, never making a word of protest or complaint.* Right after Shiloli, (Jeneral Grant was left with about ñfty thousand men. The army of General Buell was moved to Cliattanooga up the Tennessee river, projxising to ot-cujiy that coiiiiti\v. hut the enemy forced him clear to I^>uisviUe, so that all tlie ground wt-had gained was lost, except the line from the Temiesscc river to Mi-mphis. includin<r west Tennessee, which Grant had to occupy with his fifty th<msand men. And the result was the enemy took advantage of this condition and bi'oiiülit oViT-from Iho west of the Mississippi river. Generals Viiii Dorn and Price and all their t'oi-ces. They combined on Grant and the battles of Iuka and Corinth were fought and won, and General Grant says this was the most anxious period of liis service. He was not satisfied with General Rosecrans. who did not follow up the enemy as he ordered hiiu to do. and tliere was a great deal of friction among the officers there, so that General Grant did not think that we reaped the full results of the battle. However, he said nothing about that at the time. Generals MfPherson and Ord and those officers that were there made a very strong protest t« Grant in relation to the action of General liosci-rans and against his official report.
Just at that timo, two days after ttie battlo. I was in command of tlie Central Division of the Mississippi and had jtist ñnished the railroad from Columbus to Humboldt. I was down at Humboldt attending personally to the work, when I received a dispatch trom (;<>n(.' ral Graut, through General Quimby, my commanding officer, to report immediately to Corinth and take command of the second division of the Army of the Tennessee. I was dressed in a working blouse, only I had my shoulder straps on. There was a train just starting south.
I went aboard this train. When I reached Jackson, Tennessee, which was General Grant's headquarters. Col. Rawlins, his Chief of Staff, came aboard the train and asked the conductor if I was aboard. The conductor brought Rawlins * Dodge Record.
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ANNALS OF IOWA t« nif*. It was the first time I had ever seen him. He said (iencral (¡rant was on the plfitforni and wished to speak to me. T said to Colonel Kawlins, "1 am not properly tb-esscd to meet the Commander in Chief." Rawlins laughed and said, "You never mind about that; we all know about you." I went out U) the platform and General Grant met me very cordially. Tie was no better dressed than I was. so that I was greatly relieved and felt at ease immediately. lie thanked me for what I luul beou doing, and was very complinien1ai*>-in praising the work I had ficcomplished in robuildin<r the railrofid in so short a time, and then lie said, "I have assigned you to the Second Division of the Army of the Tennessee, and I want you to understand that you are not going down there to coninmnd a division of cowards." I had not then heard anytliing of tho friction at Corinth. I did not know what he nieniit and I (H)uld not ask him, and, of course, I said nothing, but thanked him. When I got to CorintK I ascertained that General liosci-miis in his report had denounced the second division comnuuided by General Davies as being a division of cowards because they fell back into the town, holding it when attaoked by an overwhelming force of the enemy.--On protest of General Davies, General Grant returned this report to General Ros'ecrans for correction, who. after investigating the matter, recalled the denunciation of the division, stating that he made it ou the report of a staff officer.
As to the protests that were sent by Generals McPherson. Ord. ])avies and other officers. General Grant, as a soldier, said right, off: "I cannot relieve General Rosecrans; he has alniady fought two f)attles and won tbem." Then these officers iip))eale<l to ^Ire. ("irant. You know when she came to visit rieiicral Grant, any one who had grievances they did not like to take tn (¡rant, took them to Mrs. Grant, who was always very kind She used tn sfiy to us, "I Ija.ve no influence with TTlysst' S* nn tliese que,stious but I will speak to him about it." Mrs. (¡rant, in speaking tn me afterwards, said she talked to the General and told him how all the men felt about General R<iserran's report. Slic snid il irrmtly disturbed him but he refused to take any action, ami that the next niorniti^ĥ e caint' out of his tent vvitli a dispatcli in his hand, waving it with great glee, and snid : "Julia, see this! It settles our troubh^s alrofidy.'' lie had in his hand a dispatch from the War Depailmcnt relieving General K^isecrans imm the command at Connth and appointing him to the command of the De])artnu-nt; and Army of the ('uniherland. General Grant said he believed he would be a success there and that he thought he would do hotter as a commanding officer tlian he did in a .subordinate position.
After the faihirc of Grimt and Sliennan'.s first niovemcnf on Vii'ks-hut'g. General (iraiit iimiicdiatcly Jiiade preparations for the second Vicksburg campaign. It is generally supposed he formed his plans of going to the rear of Vicksburg. long after he got into tliat country, but that is not true. lie had formed these plans before he st.art«d, hut he says lie did not dare divulge Ihem even to his staff officcrs or to report them to the War Dcjjartment because iie knew if he should make them known, they would be disapproved and his campaign stopped, as thi'y were eontfary to the military strategy and science tlicn taught, lie. therefore. kei)t them in his own mind. For a km^ time, high water in the Mississippi river bli)ek<'d his progress. So while waiting for the river to fall, lie kejit his army busy trying every other plan that seemed feasible, until lie cnukl run the l>atteries and JIMHTII his army to a position belinv A^icksbiirg. where he could cross the .Mivsissippi Hvi'r and go around Vicksburg and carry out his [iliuis. I state this because there are a groat many who cJiiiined after thr uaj' that the plan of going to the .south and roar of Vicksbui-ii i-nmc fnuii other officers, but (írant states in his Mcniqii-s fully ¡uni frankly his |>lKns' of thitit campaijin, and we know he never made a statement tlmt was uni true. General (_irfint said to me that tho i)olitii-iil situation in the North was such Ihat unless he luid carried (»ut this original plan he would have had to fall back to Memiihis again and renew the ültempt by land. The excitt-ment in the Nortli was such ttiat, this movement would have caused the election to have gone against the administration, and that alone, he thought, justified him in taking the great ehances he did in this the greatest piece of strategy and ttie boldest and most successful that has been written iu history.
As soon as the city of Vicksburg was captured, almost the very day, General Grant proposed to tbe Government tbat he should take his victorious army and move immediately on Mobile, but the Government had other plans and ordered that magnificent army, 70,000 stnmg to be again diatributtHÎ.
General Parks' Ninth Corps which came from east Tennessee, was immediately sent back there. General Sherniaji, with the Fifteenth Corps, was sent to Memphis and started east aeross the country. He did not know where he was going. AVhen he reached me at Corinth he said he had no idea what his objective point was. His orders were to go up the Tennessee river valley and rebuild the Memphis and Charleston road as he marched. So you see thei-e is another case where a veteran army, after a great campaign, could have moved forward, and in a month or two they could have captured Mobile, or. as an army, tliey could have gone anywhere over the South.
After General Sherinan got to Bear river he received General Grant's orders to take with him the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Aniiy Corps and march as fast as possible to Chattanooga.
President Lincoln, against the adviee of his Cabinet, sent General Grant around to take command of Chattanooga after the failure at Chiokamauga; in fact they first tried to get Genera] Thomas ti) take command of that army before they sent for General Grant.
On the 21st day of December, 1863, General Grant called to Nashville the officers he proposed to use in his next campaign. Generals Sherman, Sheridan, Rawlins and myself were there. General MePherson had gone north on a leave of absence. General Logan and the Fifteenth Corps were to be left at Huntsville. General Blair and the Seventeenth Corps were on the Mississippi river.
We were a sorry-looking lot, as our army had been iiway from any base of supplies for nearly a year and we were poorly clad, most of us wearing soldiers-' overcoats. As soon as we reported, General Grant suggested that we call upon the militai-y governor of Tennessee, Andrew Johnson. We found him in îii fint; mansion. He received us cordially and immediately opened with a tirade against the disloyal citizens, denouncing them and declaring that while he commanded Tennessee they need expect no favors from him. He was forceful in his talk and while speaking brought his fist down upon a piano, by which he was standing, with such foree thajt you could hear it all over the room. We left immediately after this speech. No one made any comment but every one thought his tirade uncalled for. I had some experience with him as my corps wintered in middle Tennessee and had to subsist off tho country, and ever>' time I foraged on a prominent rebel, I felt (iovcrnor Jolms<)D tryiny; to stop it.
After returning to Grant's headquarters, we took dinner; then General Sherman suggested that we go to the theatre, and all agreed. The army was then veteranizing nnd the theatre was full of soldiers on leave or returning. We all paid our way in, taking sí.íats in the balcony. No one knew we were in Nashville. The play of "Hamlet" was on and it was being nuirdered. General Sherman was a fine Shakespearian scholar. I sat next to him and he criticised the play severely and loudly. \ cautioned him and said. " Sherman, keep still : these l)oyK down in the pit will discitvcr yon find then there will be a scene here." Just at that lime, there came on the grave digger's .scene, where the actor soliloquizes on Yorick's skull, holding it in his hand. As he got altnut the middle of his discourse, a soldier way back in the rear, a tall man. stood up and yelled. "Say, pnrd, what is it î Tunk or Riíb ? ' ' The house came down in one great roar and General Grant said we better get out of there, and we got out.
Sherman then said, "Let's go and get some oysters." We hadn't had any for a year, and he put General Tinwlins forward to find the place. He took us to a very fair saloon. We wcnti in; the place was nearly full, there was only one large Shermaii Ihen wi*nt 1' or Riiwlins and said if we depended upon him wf would ljiivcr get anything to eat. so Sherman hailed il police officer, and be sbowed us a basement where there was an oyster siilotui kept by a wi<la\v. We went in there and ordered nur oysters. That was the first time we had all gotten together tr> talk, and instead of eating oysters as we should have doue, we went on talking to each other. Twiîlve o'clock approEiehed and tlie wonièin came to us and said, "We are obliged to close up at twelve o'clock," and askod us to pay our liill. We wcrt^ obU<red to get out of there, havingeatéit Oîjly half of tiie oysters. We wont to General Grant's headituarti-rs wln-rc u\' camiied ïitr the night. Wlien we got iMU' k, we liad to tell the story of what occurred during the evening to the staff, and the ])aper.s had it in the morning:. Before Genera! (írnni was np. the proprietor of the theatre. the saloon mnn where Rawlins irot downed mid the widow who turned us out were all U|) at head(|iiarters expecting t^ be punislied, I .suppose, for the way tliey bail treated the comtiiaiiding frenerjil of the army, but they got to General Grant and he said, "That is all right; you obeyed your order."
In the morniuíT. I remeniber, fíeneral Grant took us to a hack room oí Ihe hnusc he oecupicil as headquarters, and liiid down Iiis pliin for tbe winter campaign. He did not propose that his army should lay still Ihat winter. His plan was this: he was to lake thirty thonsand niei. from the Ohattiinooga force, go down the Ohio and Slissis.'dppi rivera to Xew Orleans, there take boats anil with the navy make a t'ombined attack on Mobile. Sherman was to go to Vicksburg, and with the Seventeenth Corps, whieh then lay at Vicksbiü*ar, iind what force lie ''ould gatlicr along tbe Mississippi river, mnve from ^'icksburg on ;\leridiaii, and then as soon as Grant landed at iîobile, was to move down aud join him. I was to liike tlie Sixteeiitli Army Corps and some ten thousand cjivalry lliat had lloen organized by (Jeneral William Sooy Smith at and wjis to move south as far as the Tcmbiybee to sweep west into ^lississippi, meet Forrest and then ilrivo him out. and swiug aronnd by Corinth, destroying all llie i-nilroat1s and sn|)|)lios in that country, and return to iiiiddlf Tennessee. (íeiKMvil (iraut's theory was to destroy nvorything in ilississippi. Tennessee and all tliat territory, so tiiat th? enemy could not occupy it again, and tben in the sprii^glho could concontrate all his forces for the spring cunipaigníí. Ile believed that if he eaptnred Mobiles he conUI move by the Alabijniii river ¡is ¡i base, capture Selma and Moutgoniei'y ¡md app'-oiicli (ieoi-gia on that line, having a Wilier base iiiste.-nl ol" tlie Intiiï raili'oad liju! from Louisville wliicli we liJid to protect in (Hit-Atilinta eanijíaign. We all ifturncd tn our coniniands prepared for tlio movement, but when General Grant i)resented his plans to Wasliington. President Lincoln disapproved of it for tliis reasonhe wiis íifríiid if Grant took tliirty thousand men from Chattaruwga, Loníístreet. who was encamped up east of Knosville, wintering in east Tennessee, would come back and retake ('hattanooíía. But. Grunt considered that the forces he had left at Chattanooga and in cast Tennessee were amjile to bold all that country. Tbis decision of Lincoln's was a great disappointment to (¡cneral (Jrnnt, so much so that he itmiiediately went to Kniisville himself witb the intention of taking the force that was at Knoxville under General Foster and going out to attinîk Longstrcet and drive him out of east Tennessee, and tlien cominy: hack and continuing his campaign. But when he got to Knoxville he found tlie winter so severe that Fnster and the forces there thought they could not accom-[ilish what he desii'ed of them, lie thought he liad no time ti) bring other forws there, and titially concluded that Foster with his forces were doing l>etter holding Longstreet than to attempt a winter campaign and perhaps not succeed.
(¡rant afterwards sai<l to us one of the mistakes he made was that he did not carry out his original plan to attack Longstreet: tlicrel'nre. no part of his plan was carried out except that General Slierman went to Vicksburg and inarched out to Jleridian without meeting any force, and destroyed the railroad. General William Sooy Smith with a cavalry force undertook to join him. but was attacked and defeated by Forrest in Mississippi aud fell back to Memphis, so that. nothing was done the whole winter and we all lay there, those great armies, from the time of the battle at Chattanooga until the next May. without accomi)lishing anything. This was the tliird plan of General (îrant's that was turned down by the Government.
When (ienci'al Grant came back from Washington about March 21, 18fj4, he called us again to Nashville and laid before us his plan for that year's (campaign. lie told us of his visit to Washintrtou and what President Lincoln said to him and what he said to the President. I will not go into that, only this far. that (¡eneral («rant accepted his comniand ujjon the condition that iiis plans should not be interfered with; that he should have a light to carry them out on his own judgment and that all the staff departments should he placed under his command. Every i;ne who was in the service knew how difficult it was in the tield to get ¡)ronipt action from the stfiff departments, especially the ciiuniiissary and qnartermaster departments; tliey claimed allegiaiu-e only to the War Department, and the staiï departments in AVashington did not recognize the authority of any commanding general in the field. Tlie reason of that is because by law they were subject ouly to the order of the Secretary of War. Mr. Lincoln answered (General Grant's re(|uest tty saying, "I cannot give the order that tlie staff departments at Washington shall obey .you," but he said, "General (Jrant, there is no authorit.v here to order tliem to disobey your order but me and you can rest assured I shall not." And he said, "I think if your order comes up here, it will lie obeyed." General Grant laid down the principle which had always Iwen in his mind, that every Tnion army in the field that faced a rebel army should move against it on a certain day and fight it until one or the other was destroyed or captured. I heard him say to (ieneral Hhennan when he laid down the plan that lie was going to move on the first day of Ma.y: "Now, General Sherman, I expect you to keep so close to Johnston and give him so mueh to do that he cannot take ¡my part of his army and send it to Lee. And I say to you that if Lee sends any portion of his command to Jolmston. I will send you two men to his one. '' Under the theory of some of our leading officers which prevailed for nearly three years in otir war, it was not good policy or strategy for two of our armies to fight at the same time. The tlieory was that if one ol: them should be wliipped they eould not succor each other. Grant's theory was that every man in the field from tbe beginning of the war to the end, every armed force, should move upon the enemy and keep them busy. The enemy had the interior lines and therefore by keeping them busy, they could not do as they did when our army in the West was lying still while there was fighting in the East, and the western rebel forces were sent e^st. Then wht'i) onr aniiy in tbe AVest was figlitiiig, the Army of the Potomac would be lying still, and Lnngstreet and a great many others were sent to the West. So that in fact while Ihey talk a great deal about prépondérance in numbers, tlKMT were very few battles fought in the Civil war where there were not as many of the enemy facing us as there w^ere men on our side. It was just that policy of handling their forces and sending them where the fighting was going on that Grant said in this meeting of the 21at he proposed to stoi).
After I got a Confederate leave at Atlanta, General Grant in OetJiber, 18t>4, sent for me to come to City Point. iK'fore General Sherman marehett to the sea. 1 went down there and spent teu days with General Grant and saw tlie armies of the Potomac and James. General (¡rant was tliinkin^ of giving lue command there but General liawlins ach ised me not to take it. AK we .sat around the camp-fire in the evenings. General Grant told me the difficulties he had met in his campaigns from the Wilderness to the James river and of lus succes.ses and his defeats. The real fact is that in the movement of May 1, 1864, there were only three armies successful ; those commanded liy Grant, Sherman and Sheridan. Banks was a failure up the Red River. Hunter, a splendid officer, was overpowered in thi-Slieniindoiih valley, thüngh at first he nearly reached Lynehhurg, Vii-ginia. Sigel was defeated and driven out of the valley and Butler was defeated at Bermutla Hundred.
There was great criticism of (irant in the East because he had not destroyed or captured Lee's anny, and when I left General Grant I returned by way of Washington and had a long and interesting intei-\-iew with President Lincoln on Grant and his campaign«. To show the feeling, as Lincoln pointed out. of the Staff and the War Department and the Cabinet at Washington toward Gran! and his-cainiiaigns. I give the dispatpli that Grant sent and Lincoln's answer. Wlten Early <lf' fefitïHl onr forces in the Slienandoah valley, Grant wanted tn send Sheri<lan there. 1'liere was great opposition to that in Washington; hut he finally sent him against tlieir protests and dispatched this word to General Halleck:
I want Sheridan pnt in command of all the troops in the field, with instructions to put himself south of the enemy ajid follow him to the death. Wherpver the enemy goes let our troops go also.T his was disrcí.ríirding tli(í timidity that kept a large force dodging to the right and left in front of Wasliiniiton for Tear the enemy might otherwise slip up and ciipture the idty. Lincoln got hold of this telepram some way. «nd sent this clinractcristifi dispati'li to General Grant. It is a ver>' important dispatch because it sliows thjtt Lim.'oln liad absolutely lost all faith in everybody around him in Washington. He saiil :
This, I think, is exactly right as to liow our forceo should move, l)ut please look over the dispatches you may have received from here pven since you made that order, and discover, if you ean. that there ¡B any idea in the head of any one here of "putting our army south of the enemy," or of "foliowirig him to the deatli" In any direction. I repeat to you. it will neither be done nor attempted, unless you watch it every day and hour and force it.' Think of that coming from tbe President of the United States with everybody subordinate to him, telling Grant unless he went there in person and saw that bis order was car-"Retellion Records, ser. I, v. 37, pt. 2, p. 558, 'Robelllon Rpcorda, aer. Ï, v. 37, pt. 2, p. 582. ried out it would uot be done. Graut inunediately weut to Wasiiiiitrtdu himself tnul put Slioridan in (ionmiantl. and you all know what Sheridan did. Now, when we read the war reeortfs we see tliat there was 110 reason why eai:h one of (irajit's recommendatious made after every battle should not have been adopted. Distributinir liis annies with a view to holding territory, instead of attacking the enemy, which was Grant's policy, was a fatal mistake, and the policy advanced that while one army was lighting a battle tlii> others should be held in reserve aud intai'l was also fatal to carrying out Grant's policies. Again, even atter all of (inmt's great victories, up to 1864, the only person in Wasliington in the Cabinet and in the War Defiarlnient who luul faith in General Grant was President ijiiH'oln. As we look at the (juestinn after reading all the reports, it is evident if any one of Gi-ant's gn-at plans had been eai-ried out after Donelson, Shiloh, Vicksburg or Chattanooga, the West would have been freed of any jrreat rebel I'lirees and the greater part of our forces in the West would have been concentrated in the East. Wlien the ofßcei-s near Genoral (ïraut discussed these questions with him, his answer at the time they occurred was that no doubt the authorities at Wasliington had good reasons for their actions which we did uot know of; that we were only looking at one part of the great problem. But in after years General Grant could see Rft well as any one that every one of his jilans should liavf! heen adopted, and that if onr armies had been kept upon the move winter and summer, it would have brought success to our forces and terminated tlie war.
(¡encrai Grant in discussing the criticisms upon him, said:
Twenty years after the close of the most stupendous war ever known, we havR writers who profess devotion to thp nation trying to prove that the nation's forcf's were not victorious. Probably they say we were slashed around Donelson to Vickaburg and Chattanooga, and in the East, Gettysburg to Appomattox, when the physical rebellion gave out from sheer exhaustion. I would like to 8ee truthful history written and history will do full credit to the courage, endurance and soldierly ability of the American citizen, no matter what section of thy country he hailed from, or in what ranks he. fought.
Speaking of those who opposed our country during the war, Grant gave his opinion :
The man who obstructs a war in which hiß nation is engaged, no matter whether right or wrong, occupies no enviable place in life or history. The most charitable posthumous history the stay-athome traitor can hope for is oblivion.
I saw a great deal of General Grant after the war, and he was just the same in civil life that he was in the service. If there was nothing doing. General Grant didn't do anything himself. If you wrote him a letter or sent Mm a dispatch when the campaign was not on, he was slow in answering it, but the moment he got into the saddle, and you sent a letter or a dispatch, it seemed as though you got an answer before you had sent it. lie seemed to anticipate just what you wanted. It was the same in civil life, so that as President and as (íeneral of the army, if some occasion Tor action arose, he met it and conquered it.
He stood high as a statesman abroad. I was all over Europe during the time he was President, and all the great civil i|uestion8 that arose during his administration he met and solved, and Europe looked upou him as highly as a statesman as he had shown himself as a soldier.
He was so modest and simple that the impression of his greatness was absolutely forced upon one from his very acts. His simjilicity Eistonished the world. No critic in this nation or any other has been able to write a word against his military course or civil life which carried strength enough to lie mentioned a second time. Grant's greatness was admitted long before he left our shores, and although simply a citizen, be was honored as no one ever was before. Some critics of General Grant have said that during the war lie absorbed from others many of his great (lualities a.s a soldier, but no one can read the war records without seeing that the strength of his dispatches and orders, the boldness of his plans, his fearless attack of superior numbers and his decisive victories in the early itnrt nf the war were equal to if not siiperior to those of the last vcars of the war.
The great distinguishing qualities of General Grant were truth, courage, modesty, generosity and loyalty. He was loyal to every work and every cause in which he was engaged; to his friends, his family, his country, and his God, and it was Ihesc eiiaraeteristies which lx)und to him ^v•ith bands of steel all those who served with him. He gave to others bouor and praise to which he was himself entitled. No ofScer served under him wlin did not understand this. I was a yonng man and given nuich larger commands tlian my rank entitled me to. Grant never failed to encourage me hy giving me credit for whatever I did, or tried to do. If I failed he assumed the responsibility; if I succeeded, he reconunended me for promotion. He always looked at the intentions of those who served under him as well as their acts. If they failed, he dropped them so (juickly and efficiently that the whole country could see and hear their fall.
BURIAL OF BLACK HAWK. The Iowa Gazette gives the following account of the hurial of this celehrated chief :
"His body, we understand, was not interred, but was I)laced on the earth in a sitting posture, with his eane clenched in his hands, enclosed with slabs or rails. This is the manner in which the chiefs of the Sac nation are usually buried, and was done at his own special reque.st. A considerable number of whites, we understand, were present at this disposition of his remains."-Albany, N. Y., The Jeffersoman, November 3, 1838.
